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I have a long history with the death penalty.  As a young attorney with an 
interest in politics in the mid-1970s, I could never have anticipated that over the 
course of my career I would inadvertently, and frequently, interface with the death 
penalty, or that I would evolve from a proponent to an opponent.  My changing 
views would parallel diminishing national support for state-sponsored death, in 
part, because new understandings challenged every claimed benefit of capital 
punishment. 
Unlike most people, I not only observed the changed death penalty debate, I 
was directly engaged: first as a legislator involved in the reconstitution of the 
modern death penalty in Ohio, later as an official overseer of the execution of 19 
men, and still later as a stunned student of startling new truths revealed by DNA. 
My support for capital punishment dwindled in part as my understanding of 
wrongful convictions grew.  DNA-proven wrongful convictions shook the 
foundations of my beliefs about our criminal justice system.  Wrongful conviction 
became the subject of a book I co-wrote with my wife, Nancy Petro: False 
Justice—Eight Myths that Convict the Innocent. 
Nancy and I did not want to include a discussion of the death penalty in this 
effort to explore flawed justice.  Our good friend, Mark Godsey, esteemed law 
professor at the University of Cincinnati College of Law and co-founder and 
Director of the Ohio Innocence Project, reviewed our manuscript and wisely 
recommended: “You have to discuss the death penalty.  It is inextricably bound to 
wrongful conviction,” he said.  “Your readers will want to know how you 
reconcile the two.” 
He was right. 
 
I. THE FIRST FORTY YEARS 
 
The evolution of my struggle with the death penalty through my personal 
experiences—from Ohio legislator, to Ohio Attorney General, to Innocence Pro 
Bono lawyer—is best shared from pertinent passages in False Justice, with some 
updates to the revised edition published in 2015 by Routledge.  Throughout this 
paper, excerpts from the book are indicated in italics.1 
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1   JIM PETRO & NANCY PETRO, FALSE JUSTICE; EIGHT MYTHS THAT CONVICT THE INNOCENT 
(Routledge rev. ed. 2015) (2010). 
78 OHIO STATE JOURNAL OF CRIMINAL LAW [Vol. 17:77 
On the morning of February 12, 2003, my wife Nancy noticed I was unusually 
quiet. 
 
“Oh,” she said, pausing as she figured it out.  “Is today the execution?” 
“Yeah,” I answered.  “Ten this morning.” 
“Who is it again?” 
“Richard Fox.” 
“That’s right.  He killed a young woman?” 
“Yes.  Leslie Keckler, an eighteen-year old college freshman.  Fox lured her 
into a fake job interview.  She drove with him to review the supposed sales route 
for the job.  He took her to a remote area, and when she refused his sexual 
advances, he stabbed her multiple times in the back.  He later admitted he then 
strangled her with a rope, ‘just to make sure she was dead.’”2 
“That’s just so horrible.” 
“I know.  It was a brutal, terrible crime.  You can’t feel the least bit sorry for 
him.  Still, I have been dreading this day.” 
I couldn’t avoid the irony of it: I was partly responsible for the existence of a 
death penalty in Ohio—and days like this.3 
About eight years before Richard Fox’s heinous crime, in January 1981, I 
was in my first month as a freshman member of the Ohio House of Representatives 
and found myself thrown into deliberations that would determine whether the 
death penalty would be reinstated in Ohio.  It was a quick and sobering baptism 
into the legislative process. 
I had been appointed to the Ohio House Judiciary Committee, which was 
determining the future of Senate Bill 1.  Ohio’s death penalty had been declared 
unconstitutional by the U.S. Supreme Court in 1972.  A new death penalty law in 
1974 had also been struck down.  This bill sought to restore Ohio’s death penalty. 
The bill before us had passed the Ohio Senate.  Its journey to become law 
required passage out of the Judiciary Committee to proceed to a vote in the House.  
The committee members were deeply divided on the issue.  With some still 
undecided, I knew my vote might determine whether the bill would go on to 
become law or would die in committee. 
When I ran for state representative, the voters in my district supported the 
death penalty by a great majority.  I supported the death penalty and said so.  
While I had thoughtfully determined my position, it is another matter to realize 
that your vote could determine whether there is a death penalty—that your vote 
could mean life or death for convicts. 
It was a tougher decision than I would have predicted.  Ultimately, I voted to 
move the bill out of committee.  With some changes, it was narrowly approved by 
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the Judiciary Committee and passed in the full House, 57 to 42.  The new law took 
effect October 19, 1981. 
As it turns out, the impact was not felt on death row for many years.  I do not 
think that Ohio’s governors at the time had much of a taste for executions.  At the 
end of his term in January 1991, Governor Richard Celeste commuted the death 
sentences of eight persons on death row to life in prison.  Eight years later, death 
row inmate Wilford Berry Jr. became “the Volunteer” by waiving all appeals.  
Prior to his execution on February 19, 1999, no one had been executed in Ohio 
since 1963, but after Berry, the pace picked up. 
When I became attorney general, one of my responsibilities was to audibly 
monitor executions so that the state would be prepared to halt the proceedings in 
case of a last-minute stay of execution.  I went to a specially equipped conference 
room in our offices to listen to the preparations and the execution.  A dedicated 
open line to the execution chamber in Lucasville, Ohio, about one hundred miles 
away, put me in direct moment-to-moment voice contact with Terry Collins, deputy 
director of the Ohio Department of Rehabilitation and Corrections. 
I had been in office about five weeks when I experienced this for the first time 
with the execution of Richard Fox.  Before the execution that day, I called 
members of Leslie Keckler’s family.  I said words to the effect that, on behalf of the 
state of Ohio, justice would be served today with the execution of Richard Fox; 
that I was sorry for their loss and the pain that Mr. Fox’s actions had caused them.  
Today the justice system would complete its response to the crime that had 
changed their lives.  
And then I listened for the first time to a man’s execution.  By then, Ohio used 
lethal injection.  Those who implemented Fox’s sentence verbalized each step of 
the procedure: the transfer of the convict, the strapping down on the gurney; the 
opportunity for last words (he had none); the activation of each vial of poison; the 
pronouncement of death. 
When it was over, I walked back to my office, closed the door, sat down, and 
took a few minutes to pull myself together.  I was shaken by this first one, and I 
never became callous to this ultimate execution of justice.  In my four years as 
attorney general, Ohio had nineteen executions.  I dreaded every one of them.  
Nevertheless, I still supported the death penalty in cases where there is no question 
as to guilt in the most heinous of crimes. 
As attorney general, I had no authority to overrule a sentence of death.  I 
came to terms with my official responsibilities regarding the death penalty as 
“rendering unto Caesar what is Caesar’s.”  The people of Ohio determined that 
this should be the state’s response to one person’s taking of another’s life.  Public 
sentiment shapes public policy through the election of legislators and judges who 
understand the people’s mandate.  Supreme Court Justice Scalia underscored this 
in his opinion on the death penalty in Kansas v. Marsh (2006): “The American 
people have determined that the good to be derived from capital punishment—in 
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deterrence, and perhaps most of all in meeting out of condign [appropriate] justice 
for horrible crimes—outweighs the risk of error.”45 
Proponents of the death penalty are consistent in their justifications for it.  
First, they say it is a deterrent.  They also claim that it saves public money: that it 
is cheaper to kill someone than to house them for life.  They contend that it brings 
closure for the victim’s family.  They view capital punishment as the reasonable, 
fair response for the state in its role of administering justice following acts that 
totally discount the value of human life—"an eye for an eye,” in Old Testament 
terms. 
None of these is the reason that I supported the death penalty.  
I don’t believe that many of these justifications are, in fact, justifiable.  In his 
book Ultimate Punishment: A Lawyer’s Reflections on Dealing with the Death 
Penalty, best-selling author and lawyer Scott Turow—an on-again, off-again 
supporter of the death penalty—shares his reflections, experience, and research on 
the ultimate punishment.  My takeaways from this book are consistent with my own 
experience and intuition.  The deterrent theory is not much more than that.  Some 
studies suggest that non-death row states have fewer murders per capita than 
death penalty states.  Turow points out that Texas has a murder rate well above 
the national average even though more than a third of the nation’s executions 
since 1976 have occurred there.6  (Note that this observation was made in 2003).7 
 
At this writing in 2019, data continues to indicate the death penalty is not a 
deterrent.  Utilizing murder rates by state per 100,000 population as reported in the 
FBI’s “Crime in the United States,” the Death Penalty Information Center has 
reported that in every year from 1990 through 2016, states without the death 
penalty consistently had lower murder rates per capita than states with the death 
penalty.8 
The economic advantage of execution over life in prison has also been 
debunked by numerous studies.  As one recent example, research published in 
2017 by an independent study comparing the costs of seeking and implementing 
the death penalty with not seeking the death penalty in the state of Oklahoma 
reported that a capital case “incurs significantly more time, effort, and costs.”9  The 
researchers also looked at other states’ studies on this question: 
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We systematically reviewed 15 state-level studies that were conducted 
between 2000 and 2016 . . . .What all of these studies have found, each to 
a varying degree, is that seeking and imposing the death penalty is more 
expensive than not seeking it . . . .There is not one credible study, to our 
knowledge, that presents evidence to the contrary.  On average it cost 
about $700,000 more in case-level costs to seek the death penalty than to 
not.10 
  
Similarly, the issues of closure for the victim’s survivors and the state’s moral 
and just response to heinous criminal acts are debatable. 
My support for the death penalty was simple and pragmatic: it was all about 
public safety.  My instructors in the lesson were Robert Daniels and John West, 
nicknamed the “Mad Dog Killers” by Ohio’s newspapers. 
From the early years of our marriage, I heard the story of horrific events that 
occurred in and around Tiffin, Ohio, the week of my wife’s birth in July 1948.  The 
Bero family, who lived in Tiffin, would remember this week for the arrival of their 
first daughter, Nancy, but for many Ohioans, the week would be marked by a 
murderous rampage. 
Robert Daniels and John West, just released from the Ohio State Reformatory 
in Mansfield, apparently were determined to get revenge, although half of their 
victims would be random.  The first person they murdered was a Columbus tavern 
owner.  Daniels and West next drove to Mansfield, where they went to the home of 
John Niebel, the prison’s farm superintendent.  Daniels and West broke into his 
home, pistol whipped Niebel and his wife, raped their twenty-year-old daughter, 
forced all three to strip and marched them outside into a field where Daniels and 
West executed them. 
The following day, they drove toward Tiffin, about fifty-five miles away.  
Nancy’s parents, even into their nineties, still recall the terrible details.  Daniels 
and West followed a newly married couple driving at night.  Forcing their car to a 
stop, the two criminals approached the car and then shot the young man in the 
face.  His bride miraculously managed to escape execution by running to a nearby 
farmhouse. 
When Daniels and West needed to switch vehicles, they shot and killed a truck 
driver who was asleep in his truck near Old Fort, Ohio.  Two days later, they 
finally stopped in Van Wert, near the Ohio-Indiana border, when they came to a 
roadblock and engaged in a shootout with police.  West was killed, Daniels was 
captured.  He reportedly bragged about his potential date with the electric chair, 
which occurred six months later. 
In those days, Nancy’s grandparents had the forerunner of a bed-and-
breakfast in Tiffin.  In the 1940s, these were called “tourist homes.”  Nancy’s 
grandmother loved to welcome traveling businesspeople; most were regular 
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customers.  She recalled two strangers who came to the rear side door, rather than 
the front porch entrance, looking for a room the week that her granddaughter was 
born.  She had no vacancy, but she said if they waited a moment, she would call 
the other area guesthouses to try to find them a room.  They waited outside while 
she made the calls.  She located a room for them two blocks away.  Curiously, they 
used the room to clean up but left without staying overnight.  Nancy’s 
grandmother later realized that the timing, appearance, and odd behavior of the 
men suggested they might have been West and Daniels.  She felt blessed to have 
been spared.  That is why this story was told twenty-some years later when I 
started to visit Tiffin with Nancy. 
I always had thought—and Nancy’s parents thought—that West and Daniels 
were escapees.  However, we learned that they had actually been released from 
prison early, ironically, for good behavior.  That detail did not change my view 
that capital punishment was justifiable for reasons of public safety. 
After hearing of the brutality of West and Daniels and others like them, I 
determined that some people were the equivalent of predatory wild animals.  John 
Walsh, in addressing the National Association of Attorneys General at its 
February 2010 meeting, shared lessons learned in the years of seeking criminals 
through the television program he hosted from 1988 to 2012, America’s Most 
Wanted.  In 1981, his own son, six-year-old Adam, was abducted from a 
department store in Hollywood, Florida, and killed. The presumed killer, who died 
in prison before he could be charged, had committed several other murders. 
Walsh, citing pedophiles as an example, said that these predators have an 
inexplicable sexual “compulsion” that is so strong that he has seen pedophiles 
even in their eighties who are still compelled to seek despicable sexual acts with 
children.  Like other sociopaths, they feel no remorse after committing horrendous 
crimes.11 
 
Robert Daniels and John West, and others like them, were among the 
malevolent elite appropriately described as “the worst of the worst.”  They were in 
our view, evil personified.  Still, as we wrote this section of the book, I was 
transitioning from narrowly supporting the death penalty for these sociopaths to 
growing concern over the system’s increasing evidence of conviction error and the 
very real risk of executing innocent people. 
At the time, we wrote: 
 
We should no more release such a person than we would free a wild tiger 
from the zoo.  The challenge is to identify those beyond a redemptive life in public 
society, but certain criminal acts warrant this indictment. 
The state appropriately has the responsibility to respond to unacceptable 
crime, and in America, the citizens shape this response, whether they recognize 
their role or not.  My view is that God will be the ultimate judge of those like 
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Robert Daniels and John West—but also of us, if we should neglect to take every 
precaution against making a mistake when imposing the death penalty.  When the 
state takes a life on behalf of justice, there is no room for error, and we can never 
become callous to the enormity of this responsibility. 
Fortunately, I had a high degree of confidence in the guilt of the men who 
were scheduled for execution during my watch.  Except for one. 
John Spirko was convicted in 1983 of the murder of Mary Jane Mottinger, the 
postmistress in Elgin, Ohio.  Spirko was the only execution scheduled during my 
term in which conviction was based solely on circumstantial evidence.  He had 
served time for another murder and was not a good guy, but many were concerned 
about the weak evidence that convicted him of this crime.  I sought to ensure that 
no stone was unturned with regard to testing the crime evidence for DNA.  The 
results were not definitive; I asked for another reprieve for testing.  Then more 
testing, then another reprieve.  Governor Bob Taft granted my multiple requests 
for reprieves until his successor, Governor Ted Strickland, inherited the case. 
On January 9, 2008, after I had requested seven reprieves and personally 
expressed my concerns to Governor Strickland’s chief of staff, the Governor 
resolved the issue: 
 
Mr. Spirko’s claims that his own lies led to his conviction for an offense 
that he did not commit are unpersuasive in the face of the judicial 
scrutiny this case has received.  Nonetheless, I have concluded that the 
lack of physical evidence linking him to the murder, as well as the slim 
residual doubt about his responsibility for the murder that arises from 
careful scrutiny of the case record and revelations about the case over 
the past twenty years, makes the imposition of the death penalty 
inappropriate in this case. 
 
Referencing the lengthy review of the case, he concluded, “I have decided to 
commute Mr. Spirko’s sentence to life imprisonment without the possibility of 
parole.”12 
I was pleased with the governor’s decision.  When there is any legitimate 
doubt, commute. 
With due acknowledgment of my cautious support of the death penalty, I did 
not come to the question of the extent of wrongful conviction in America with a 
strong bias on either side of the debate. 
Nancy and I considered the death penalty positions of those who sought to 
quantify conviction errors.  At the time of our research (2008–2010), we learned 
that District Attorney Joshua Marquis supported the death penalty in Oregon, a 
state that had executed two men since the death penalty had been restored in 1984.  
His calculation of a .027 percent error rate was cited by Antonin Scalia in Kansas 
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V. Marsh.  In this same opinion, the conservative Supreme Court justice criticized 
Professor Samuel R. Gross’s inclusion of some of the exonerated in Gross’s study 
(the basis of his calculation of a significantly higher conviction error rate of 2.3 
percent) as not fitting the definition of an innocent person. 
Professor Gross responded by saying, “It is possible that a few of the 
hundreds of exonerated defendants we have studied were involved in the crimes for 
which they were convicted, despite our efforts to exclude such cases.  On the other 
hand, it is certain—this is the clearest implication of our study—that many 
defendants who are not on this list, no doubt thousands, have been falsely 
convicted of serous crimes but have not been exonerated.”13  Gross opposes the 
death penalty, but his focus is wrongful conviction, his greater concern. 
Justice Scalia referenced Marquis’s error rate of .027 percent, less than 
three-hundredths of 1 percent, seeming to imply that this might be acceptable.  
“One cannot have a system of criminal punishment without accepting the 
possibility that someone will be punished mistakenly,” he wrote.14 
This raises the question of what is acceptable error in our justice system.  A 
culture is defined in some ways by what it finds acceptable.  When a commercial 
airplane crashes, the National Transportation Safety Board begins a painstaking 
investigation to determine the cause of the accident.  Even the suspicion of a 
repeatable problem can ground an entire airline.  Americans do not find errors in 
flight acceptable.  The error rate in the justice system—whether the most 
conservative or most liberal calculation—would not be even remotely tolerated in 
the U.S. food industry or the U.S. pharmaceutical industry, for example.  Why we 
have accepted it in the justice system is another question. 
We believe that Marquis’s conviction error estimate of .027 percent is flawed 
and a significant understatement.  Nevertheless, if you apply that error percentage 
to our prison population in 2008, it would mean that 621 innocent persons were 
incarcerated in U.S. prisons that year.  If these Americans were instead in a prison 
in a foreign land, it would constitute an international crisis. 
If Professor Gross’s death row 2.3 percent error rate were applied to the 
same prison population, it would suggest that more than 50,000 innocent 
Americans are imprisoned, but Gross believes that errors in the broader felony 
population are probably less frequent.  The summary of his original study 
concluded, “[A]ny plausible guess at the total number of miscarriages of justice in 
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America in the last fifteen years must be in the thousands, perhaps tens of 
thousands.”15, 16 
 
After the book was published, Professor Gross reported the astounding results 
of a subsequent study that indicated over four percent of those sentenced to death 
in the United States are likely innocent.  In his peer-reviewed article, “Rate of 
False Conviction of Criminal Defendants who are Sentenced to Death,” published 
May 20, 2014, in the highly respected scientific journal, Proceedings of the 
National Academy of Sciences of the United States of America, Gross and his 
colleagues utilized survival analysis, commonly used in medicine, to determine the 
4.1 percent finding, which the authors of the study considered “conservative.”17 
 
All things considered (including all that we had yet to learn), Nancy and I 
have concluded that Professor Gross’s calculations are both credible and 
probable. 
Another bit of information stunned us and supported the conclusion of 
significant conviction error.  In 1996, the National Institute of Justice 
commissioned a landmark study, “Convicted by Juries, Exonerated by Science: 
Case Studies in the Use of DNA Evidence to Establish Innocence After Trial,” that 
sought to spark discussion by the justice and scientific communities on the 
challenge of incorporating DNA analysis in criminal justice.  Included in the study, 
a commentary by Peter Neufeld and Barry Scheck revealed the surprising 
consistency of inaccurate identification of the perpetrator in rape cases where 
DNA testing could affirm or exclude the suspect: 
 
Every year since 1989, in about 25 percent of the sexual assault cases 
referred to the FBI where results could be obtained (primarily by state 
and local law enforcement), the primary suspect has been excluded by 
forensic DNA testing.  Specifically, FBI officials report that out of 
roughly 10,000 sexual assault cases since 1989, about 2,000 tests have 
been inconclusive (usually insufficient high molecular weight DNA to do 
testing), about 2,000 tests have excluded the primary suspect, and about 
6,000 have “matched” or included the primary suspect.18 
 
The evidence sent to the FBI in these cases was typically sperm from swabs taken 
from the victim (vaginally, anally, orally) or from the victim’s clothing.  
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Identification of the suspect was primarily from eyewitness testimony.19  Generally, 
the prosecution not only confirmed these results with its own testing but also tested 
any males known to be in a recent relationship with the victim, to rule them out.20 
In short, local authorities—law enforcement and prosecutors—thought they 
had their rapist, and over many years, rape kit DNA, tested either by the FBI or in 
private labs, consistently proved an error rate of about 25 percent.  Prior to DNA, 
there is no question that a percentage of these DNA-excluded suspects would have 
been tried and convicted (state conviction rates for felony sexual assaults average 
about 62 percent).21 
What does this say about those in prison who were convicted of rape before 
1989, before DNA?  What does it say about people convicted of crimes today in 
which there is no DNA evidence to test? 
This rate of incorrect arrest was shocking to us.  It was irrefutable evidence of 
significant arrest and conviction error. 
Scheck and Neufeld articulated the implications of these results: “The fact 
that these percentages have remained constant for seven years…strongly suggests 
that post-arrest and post-conviction DNA exonerations are tied to some strong, 
underlying systemic problems that generate erroneous accusations and 
convictions.” 22, 23 
 
II. UPDATE: CONVICTION ERRORS CONTINUE TODAY 
 
As I write this update, on July 25, 2019, The National Registry of 
Exonerations is reporting 2,472 known exonerations in the United States since 
1989.  More than 21,725 years of imprisonment have been lost by these wrongfully 
convicted persons.  Frightening subsets of this group exist: 944 had been convicted 
of murder and 123 had been sentenced to death.24 
By way of disclosure, Nancy and I serve on the advisory board of the Registry, 
a project of the University of California Irvine Newkirk Center for Science & 
Society, University of Michigan Law School, and Michigan State University 
College of Law.  The bar is high for inclusion in the Registry. These are not cases 
of getting off on a technicality. An exoneration occurs when a wrongfully 
convicted person is officially cleared of the conviction(s) due to new evidence of 
innocence. 
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The challenge of proving innocence after conviction in a system that values 
finality, and has uncertain, time-consuming, and laborious pathways to any 
reconsideration of guilt or innocence, greatly restricts access to justice for innocent 
people who have suffered this ultimate injustice.  This reality strongly suggests 
that those who are exonerated are the tip of the iceberg of those wrongly convicted 
who will never have the opportunity to prove their innocence. 
Consider the 123 people who we now know were convicted of murder, 
sentenced to death, and were later officially exonerated.  Their lives were spared 
either because appeal rulings or new evidence of innocence resulted in a 
commutation of the sentence or a reversal of the verdict before the death sentence 
was implemented. 
But how many wrongly convicted people have been unable to attract legal 
counsel willing to pursue the long, uncertain road to exoneration? 
 
III. A CHANGE OF HEART AND MIND 
 
The growing and frightening body of evidence of the very real risk of 
wrongful execution tipped the scales for me from support to opposition of the 
death penalty.  Very simply, I realized the risk of a state executing an innocent 
person was greater than the risk of a death row inmate escaping and killing 
innocent victims.  I concluded that life in prison presents the better option, and I 
became a proponent of this solution. 
Since this conversion, realities concerning both the magnitude of wrongful 
conviction and flawed application of the death penalty have become more apparent.  
The nation has grappled with the methods of death and the meaning of “cruel and 
unusual punishment.” 
There has been increasing evidence throughout the United States of the 
uneven and unfair application of the death penalty.  Nationally, an effort to enact 
standards for a fair and accurate death penalty process was undertaken by the 
American Bar Association.  A 2007 American Bar Association (ABA) report 
assessing Ohio’s death penalty laws, procedures and practices found that Ohio did 
not comply with 29 ABA established recommendations, partially complied with 35, 
and fully complied with only 4 of 65 recommendations in which sufficient 
information was available to make an assessment.25 
To initiate a comprehensive review of Ohio’s efforts, Ohio Supreme Court 
Chief Justice Maureen O’Connor created the Joint Task Force to Review the 
Administration of Ohio’s Death Penalty in 2011.  Two years of engagement by the 
Task Force members, a balanced array of judges, prosecutors, defense attorneys, 
and academics, resulted in a comprehensive Task Force report published in 2014.  
The Task Force made 56 recommendations to the Supreme Court of Ohio and the 
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Ohio State Bar Association that the Task Force believed would “promote fairness 
in capital cases for both the state and the defendant.  In addition, the 
recommendations would respond to the majority of the American Bar 
Association’s proposals from its 2007 report.”26 
 
IV. WE CAN DO MUCH BETTER, BUT STILL CANNOT AVOID RISK OF WRONGFUL 
EXECUTION 
 
If we were to adopt the recommendations resulting from this superb effort of 
leading criminal justice and legal professionals in Ohio, I am confident the risk of 
wrongful conviction and wrongful execution would be reduced and Ohio’s 
application of the death penalty would be fairer.  Nonetheless, my opposition to the 
death penalty would remain. 
Formed over decades of experience and troubling evolving truths, my 
opposition to the death penalty will remain, because it is based on a fundamental 
understanding that truth is elusive and humans are flawed.  Knowing what we now 
know in this post-DNA world, we must abandon the death penalty.  This is the 
only conclusion I find consistent with logic, conscience, and our nation’s 
fundamental guarantee of justice for all. 
                                                                                                                                            
26  J. Jim Brogan et al., Joint Task Force to Review the Administration of Ohio’s Death 
Penalty: Final Report and Recommendations, SUPREME COURT OF OHIO, 4 (2014), 
https://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/deathPenalty/resources/finalReport.pdf. 
